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Abstract 
This paper examines the quality of impact assessments in the European Commission and the 
United Kingdom for the period 2005-2010. We coded 477 impact assessments for the UK and 
251 for the European Commission, using a detailed scorecard - adjusted to reduce the bias 
evidenced by previous usages of this instrument.  
The findings suggest that impact assessment is not merely a perfunctory activity in the 
European Union and the UK. Quality has improved steadily over the years, arguably as a 
result of learning and regulatory oversight. The UK and the European Commission are 
strikingly similar on a number of impact assessment dimensions (such as economic analysis 
and identification of costs and benefits). The impact assessments of the European 
Commission seem to pay more attention to social and environmental aspects, however. The 
conclusions reflect on the implications of our findings for current policy discussions on 
regulatory quality and the role of regulatory oversight bodies. 
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Regulatory Quality in the European 
Commission and the UK: 
Old questions and new findings 
CEPS Working Document No. 362/January 2012 
Oliver Fritsch, Claudio M. Radaelli, Lorna Schrefler 
and Andrea Renda 
1. Introduction 
Regulatory impact assessment or, given its extension to non-regulatory proposals, impact 
assessment (IA) is now a common tool for policy appraisal in the EU and the United 
Kingdom. Its thrust is to carry out a type of pre-legislative scrutiny of new policy proposals. 
This scrutiny revolves around a definition of the problem to be regulated, an appraisal of the 
status quo and its likely evolution, consultation, an economic analysis of the likely effects of 
a range of feasible alternatives that address the identified problem, and an indication of the 
preferred policy option.  
In the European Commission (2011), IA is used for legislative and non-legislative proposals 
such as white papers, communications and non-binding recommendations. In the UK, both 
central government and regulatory agencies employ IA in a variety of ways. However, most 
of the IAs carried out in the UK concern statutory instruments and proposals for primary 
legislation. In EU member states other than the UK, the implementation of IA represents a 
kind of patchwork (De Francesco, Radaelli and Troeger 2011) given the tendency to perform 
narrow cost assessments (e.g., checks on administrative obligations rather than full benefit-
cost assessments). Previous research has shown that the UK and the EU have embedded IA 
in pre-legislative scrutiny, and represent political systems in which the institutionalisation of 
ex-ante appraisal has gone further than in other member states (Renda, 2006, 2011; Hertin et 
al., 2009; Radaelli, 2010b; European Parliament, 2011a). 
What does ‘institutionalisation’ mean in the context of IA? Institutionalisation has two sides. 
First, the regular production of IAs - both the European Commission Directorates-General 
(DGs) and British departments – are heavy producers of assessments compared to the 
average EU member state. Second, there are oversight bodies (Wiener & Alemanno, 2010; 
Renda, 2010). The UK Regulatory Policy Committee (RPC), established in 2009, follows the 
experience of other European countries (like Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands) and the 
European Commission with oversight bodies. The RPC has published opinions and data on 
the quality of IA. However, more recently, it has gained competences in exercising oversight 
on departments at a much earlier stage. Rather than publishing opinions on completed IAs, 
the RPC interacts with departments during the production phase and suggests modifications 
or types of analysis. The RPC is an independent body with its own secretariat. It does not 
take instructions from the Cabinet Office or other branches of government, although of 
course it implements the government policies on impact assessment, enshrined in guidelines 
published in 2007 and 2010, respectively. 
Oversight in the European Commission follows a different structure. The Impact Assessment 
Board (IAB) publishes opinions on the IAs produced by the different DGs – contrast this 
with the work ‘behind the scenes’ of the RPC. In fairness, parts of the European 
Commission’s work on IAs take place behind closed doors: the Commission only publishes 
2 | FRITSCH, RADAELLI, SCHREFLER & RENDA 
 
final versions of IAs, together with the IAB opinion on previous drafts and the 
corresponding legislative proposal. Earlier draft IAs, by contrast, are not made public. If the 
IAB requests DGs to resubmit draft IAs and then issues a second opinion on the resubmitted 
IA, both IAB opinions and the final IA (but not the draft IA) are made public. The IAB brings 
together five permanent and four rotating Director-level officers from different DGs in their 
personal capacity.1 It answers to the President of the European Commission. Its work is 
prepared by the Secretariat General of the Commission. The IAB is similar to OIRA in the US 
- the Office for Information and Regulatory Affairs that works in the Presidential 
Administration, inside the Office for Management and Budget. 
Given this widespread usage and institutionalisation, there is a lively discussion on whether 
and to what extent the IA system has been successful in the UK and the EU. There are several 
components of success. One can think of various forms of control of regulatory proposals, 
but also of how oversight enables departments to learn about policy appraisal and the usage 
of evidence in policy formulation. Radaelli and Meuwese (2010) have looked at how the 
Secretariat General of the Commission and the different DGs interact. They found that 
learning occurs because this interaction has increased the integration of different 
perspectives in the formulation of different proposals. There is no equivalent study for the 
UK, although Radaelli (2010b) found that in the UK both the logic of oversight as 'control' 
and as ‘stimulating learning’ matter. 
Control  has to be qualified – this term may be confusing. Drawing on the US debate, 
Radaelli (2010b) shows that under certain conditions regulatory oversight may become 
partisan political control. Under these conditions, more oversight means less evidence-based 
policy rather than tougher economic appraisal of proposed regulations. However, he finds 
that this risk is less likely to appear in Europe than in North America, given the different 
structure of power in presidential systems like the US, the UK Westminister system, and the 
mixed polity of the EU. 
Although it seems unlikely that the IAB could tilt oversight towards partisan political 
control, there are other questions. Lobbysts, domestic policy-makers and some Members of 
the European Parliament have raised different issues: Is the IAB independent enough to 
produce robust challenges to Commission IAs – a reservation often expressed by interest 
groups and the European Parliament (European Parliament, 2011b)? Should the IAB be 
staffed by independent experts like the UK RPC? Or should we care about de facto 
independence rather than formal independence?  
IAs are used for purposes other than control and stimulating evidence-based learning. More 
than one project (Hertin et al., 2009; National Audit Office, various years; Radaelli, 2009b) 
has evidenced perfunctory usages of IA. Although the UK and the EU IAs are often flagged 
up as examples of serious attempts to appraise policies, officers might also use IA to justify 
regulatory proposals rather than to stop poor policy proposals via the systematic analysis of 
economic, social or environmental effects.2 Several legislative proposals put forward by the 
European Commission, for instance, are mandated revisions of existing acts. This may 
reduce the incentive and scope for more innovative policy solutions. To date, we are aware 
                                                     
1 Initially, the IAB had five permanent members. Since November 2011, the Board has nine members 
representing different DGs of the Commission. A rotation system to ensure that all DGs are 
represented at one point in time was also introduced. For further details, see: 
(http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/iab/members_en.htm). 
2 In this respect, the following quote from the European Commission (2002) is rather telling: “rally 
support for [Commission’s] proposal”. This approach was abandoned in successive EC 
Communications on Better/Smart Regulation. 
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of two cases where an impact assessment led to the non-adoption of an EU policy proposal, 
amongst others, the “Mountain Label” initiative of 2010.3 There may be more instances, of 
course, but we do not expect this number to be significant.  
Yet how perfunctory is the use of IA in the European Commission and the UK? How 
symbolic is the process of impact assessment – a question that has arisen in more than one 
report of the National Audit Office on regulatory appraisal in the UK? How complete are 
policy appraisals in these two jurisdictions? So far, empirical evidence is scarce (for an EU-
US comparison, see Cecot et al., 2008).  
This paper analyses impact assessments produced between 2005 and 2010 in the UK and at 
EU level. To this end, we have coded information on IA in the European Commission and 
the UK. Specifically, we ask whether the quality of IA has improved over the years and what 
the main differences are between the two systems. The remainder of the paper is organised 
as follows: in Section 2, we briefly review methods to appraise the quality of IA. Section 3 is 
dedicated to data collection and methods. Section 4 presents our findings and Section 5 a 
discussion of our evidence. Section 6 is devoted to our conclusions and policy implications. 
2. Measuring impact assessments: a short overview of the methods 
There are several ways to establish the quality of IA (for an overview on the study of IA in 
Europe, see Turnpenny et al., 2009). The OECD relies on intensive peer review when 
preparing reports on the capacity of governments to produce high-quality regulation 
(OECD, 2009). OECD missions also make use of consultants who examine samples of IAs 
and carry out interviews. This enables the OECD to produce qualitative findings that can 
then be matched with a large set of indicators of the regulatory system that cover IA 
guidelines, consultation standards and the like. However, these indicators do not inform us 
about how these guidelines and standards are implemented in individual IAs. 
Alternatively, other authors select a sample of IAs and trace the whole process of producing 
the assessment. To this end, teams of researchers interview policy officers and stakeholders 
and examine in detail the IA and its enclosed documents. Among others, the Evaluation 
Partnership and the European Court of Auditors have produced some case studies of IA in 
their evaluation of the European Commission’s system (The Evaluation Partnership, 2007; 
European Court of Auditors, 2010 – the ECA cases were not released however). Similarly, 
Nilsson et al. (2008) use case studies in their comparative study on appraisal tools in Europe. 
In order to facilitate and promote case study-based research on IA, a website has been set up 
containing various IA examples.4 Case studies help to establish causality, i.e. provide in-
depth knowledge about the appraisal process as well as its prehistory and effects. However, 
case studies are limited in terms of statistical generalisation. Although researchers use 
explicit criteria for selecting their cases, the total number of IAs analysed through this 
approach is too low to make valid claims on, say, whether the average IA is improving 
across time or departments. 
Scorecard approaches, originally produced by Robert Hahn and his team (Hahn & Dudley, 
2004), constitute a third approach to measuring quality. Researchers design a coding frame 
or scorecard to measure selected quality features of individual IAs. If coders are properly 
trained, and there is an acceptable level of inter-coder reliability, the scorecard method can 
                                                     
3 This initiative was part of a broader package proposal for a Regulation on agricultural product 
quality schemes, COM (2010)733. For further details on this case, see: 
(http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/key_docs/docs/sec_2011_126_en.pdf). 
4 See: (http://www.liaise-noe.eu/content/library-ia-case-studies).  
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be used to code a large stock of IAs. US-based researchers use scorecards in order to to check 
on trends in quality, specific aspects of quality (such as benefit-cost ratios), and whether 
different presidential administrations have an influence on cost and benefit estimates of 
federal executive agencies.  
A variant of this approach is to calculate all the costs (as measured in the IAs) introduced by 
legislation or regulation in a given year. These compilation studies are used in the US and 
the UK to provide burden barometers and other total estimates of the costs of legislation and 
regulation. In Europe, a pioneering study drew explicitly on Hahn's method to measure the 
quality of the IAs produced by the European Commission between 2003 and 2005, the 
genetic stage of regulatory appraisal in the EU (Renda, 2006, 2011). The UK’s National Audit 
Office (NAO) uses its own scorecard to appraise different aspects of IA (National Audit 
Office, 2005; 2006; 2007; 2009). NAO samples vary by year, so there is no single time series 
available by collating all the annual reports of IA. Interestingly, the NAO uses traffic light 
indicators in order to capture the overall quality of features such as problem definition, 
consultation, economic analysis, and monitoring and evaluation. 
This paper also builds on the scorecard approach. Scorecards are not ‘innocent’, however. 
They may contain several sources of bias. Any analysis of a new regulatory or legislative 
proposal should be commensurate with the importance and content of the proposal. ‘More 
analysis’ is required for proposals that affect a large cross-section of stakeholders and sectors. 
To classify an IA as incomplete because it does not quantify all costs and benefits (on the 
enviroment, gender, etc.) may miss the point if the IA was carried out on a narrow 
modification of existing legislation, for example. There are also cases where ‘more analysis’ 
means paralysis rather than high quality regulation. 
Further, the content is important: when assessing a regulation on equal pay among men and 
women, one would care about gender effects much more than about the analysis of possible 
impacts on climate change and the environment. IA guidelines take full account of this. 
European Commission guidelines, for instance, stipulate that all IAs should follow the 
principle of proportionate analysis: major legislative-regulatory innovations require major 
analysis. Minor episodes of change would not need to go beyond streamlined tests and 
consultation. Consequently, IA guidelines try to avoid two possible regulatory failures: 
paralysis by analysis (too many IA calculations may become hurdles that delay the 
introduction of useful regulation) and the waste of resources (why spend time calculating the 
climate change effects of a proposal that has no conceivable effect on climate?). 
There is yet another possible bias in comparing IAs produced by different systems. In 
country A the guidelines may suggest cost-benefit analysis as the main technique for 
assessment, whilst country B’s guidelines may direct officers towards a range of techniques. 
In one country the guidelines may insist on the analysis of costs arising from administrative 
obligations, in another this may be an item like many others – and oversight bodies may 
accord these items different importance in different countries. In addition, the guidelines 
vary over the years and have changed in the UK and the European Commission twice every 
ten years or so. What is ‘mandatory’ today (in terms of analysis of certain costs or benefits) 
might have been ‘optional’ six years ago. 
With this qualifications in mind, what can researchers code in an IA? The latter is made up of 
n-items that can be coded to answer questions such as: did the regulator explain if there is a 
market failure? Did the officers report on how consultation findings fed back into the 
analysis? What about effects on gender, health, and small and medium enterprises? What 
did the authors of the IA say about monitoring and evaluation? It follows that if, in our 
sample, we find IAs that score ‘Yes’ on 40% of all items, we have no way of knowing 
whether this is because the remaining 60% were irrelevant given the content and entity of the 
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proposal, or should have been calculated. Moreover, what seems irrelevant to a coder may 
look potentially very interesting to another. However, this bias can be smoothed by clear 
codebooks containg unambigious definitions of the variables, training, and other attempts to 
achieve high degrees of inter-coder reliability. 
The nature of comparisons is at the heart of another source of bias. To compare the IA 
activity of, say, the European Commission, the UK, and the US means to compare different 
regulatory systems. In principle, all legislative and non-legislative EU proposals included in 
the European Commission’s Annual Work Programme are subject to assessment. The 
European Court of Auditors (2010), however, gave evidence that the practical side of things 
looks different. Still, IA at the EU level covers legislative proposals and non-binding 
initiatives, as well as the implementation phase on the so-called delegated acts (formerly 
referred to as the comitology procedure). In the UK, the IA has a similarly broad coverage, 
spanning from major legislative innovations (such as the failed attempts to introduce 
identity cards) to department regulations on the size and positions of aerials on private 
houses, horse passports, and the height of hedges in home gardens. Independent regulators 
are also required to examine their proposals via IA. 
In the US, primary legislation is not subject to pre-legislative assessment via IA. Neither is 
the activity of independent regulatory agencies, although other types of scrutiny are carried 
out. Only major new regulations proposed by federal executive agencies go through the filter 
of what we normally call IA. Thus, US scorecards usually deal with rulemaking activities of 
federal executive agencies. In the UK, one would instead measure a vast territory of primary 
and secondary legislation, as well as the rule-making of independent regulators.  
In consequence, the scorecard approach implies the use of the same measuring instrument 
on different universes. To perform this analysis and conclude that, say, the systems fare 
differently in terms of benefit estimation, or some other characteristics, is a mistake (see also 
the differences between IA systems in Radaelli, 2009a, 2010a). Obviously, it is easier to 
estimate benefits in the case of rule-making by federal executive agencies with a clear 
mission than in the case of a pilot project on a consolidated tax system for the EU, or a white 
paper on tourism in Europe in the year 2020. On the other hand, the EU and the UK differ in 
that the latter does not require white papers and communications to be subject to IA. 
Further, the background and identity of policy officers carrying out IAs may also differ: 
British officers tend to be generalists while European Commission officials have 
backgrounds that are more diverse; in particular ‘technical’ DGs such as transport or the 
environment employ many more experts than generalists. 
3. Data and methods 
To reduce bias, we sought to partially overcome the problem that not all IAs need to present 
all the features of the scorecard – remember the ‘paralysis by analysis’ and ‘proportionate 
analysis’ discussion in the previous section. Instead of entering a ‘No’ value when an item 
was not calculated in a given IA, we have entered a ‘Yes’ value when the IA explained why a 
certain impact was not addressed. Even brief statements like “this policy proposal has 
obviously no effect on health” would be coded as ‘Yes’ in our project – rather than ‘No’. The 
rationale for this is that our scorecard items refer to features of the IA contemplated by the 
current official guidelines in the UK and the EU. Hence, we expected officers to motivate 
their lack of calculation of a given item. Conversely, a ‘No’ in our scorecard indicates either a 
case in which the IA drafter chose not to specify that an impact is not relevant and is thus not 
analysed further (this is less likely in the UK as IAs are accompanied by checklists for a series 
of impacts), or a case where an official guideline item was entirely ignored. The impossibility 
to distinguish between these two cases is a limitation of the scorecard approach, however 
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one could argue that a prudent IA drafter would explicitly clarify when an impact is not 
relevant, even when this means repeating such exercises for most items (and as explained 
this would result in a ‘Yes’ in our scorecard).  
Turning to our sample construction (Table 1), for the EU we coded all the IAs on binding 
legislative proposals5 produced from 2005 to 2009. The UK production exceeds by far the 
production of the EU (on average, the UK produces 320 IAs a year, the European 
Commission only 93). We therefore created a complete database of all UK RIAs by tracking 
down the original universe of IAs from the official websites and the government’s command 
papers. We then extracted a representative sample of some 500 from departments that are 
roughly comparable with DGs in the European Commission. The sample is stratified by year 
(2005 to summer 2010) and departments. Naturally, departments that produce a limited 
number of IAs represent a lower share of our sample. 
The scorecards for the EU and the UK contain the same items. Hence, we did not consider 
typically European scorecard items, e.g. tests on the EU’s subsidiarity principle that are 
hardly applicable in the UK. Although our scorecard is based on the 2009 EU and the 2007 
UK IA guidelines, respectively, we have selected for this paper a set of items that are 
commonly included in all IA guidelines across the world, and were indeed present in 
previous versions of the guidelines both in the EU and in the UK. This approach allows us to 
avoid cases of ‘unfair scoring’ where an item required only by the most recent set of 
guidelines yields only ‘No’ in impact assessment drafted according to previous guidance. 
Table 1. Number of Impact Assessments coded for the UK and the EU6 
 UK  EU  
2005 85 41 
2006 93 35 
2007 81 49 
2008 94 83 
2009 82 43 
2010 42 Not available 
TOTAL 477 251 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
As the above table shows, there is a surge of binding proposals in 2008 (a year before the end 
of the Barroso I Commission’s mandate) followed by a decrease in the number of proposals 
to previous levels in 2009. This point is further discussed below. It is worth noting, however, 
that the total number of IAs in the European Commission (on both binding and non-binding 
instruments) remained roughly constant for the timeframe covered by this paper. It is only in 
the case of binding legislation that 2008 exhibits a marked increase. Although we have not 
scored IAs for 2010, for that year the number of IAs on binding proposals is 39, roughly in 
line with the previous periods. 
                                                     
5 That is, IAs for Regulations, Directives, and Decisions. Although we have data also on IAs for non-
binding proposals, these were not used in the paper as they cover instruments that may not 
correspond to policy initiatives in the UK (as already explained). In other words, this reduces the risk 
of comparing apples with oranges. 
6 The scoring of 2010 EU impact assessments is still underway. 
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4. Evidence 
We coded and measured 93 scorecard items for the UK and 203 for the EU. In this paper, we 
present the most important results concerning costs and benefits of regulation, and contrast 
these findings with a control group of non-CBA scorecard items, e.g. on policy options or 
various kinds of policy impacts. We leave aspects such as problem definition, consultation, 
monitoring and evaluation to other papers arising from this project.  
In terms of economic analysis, it is customary to refer to different aspects of cost and benefit 
estimation. The basic elements of economic analysis concern the identification of costs and 
benefits, their quantification (in a metric other than monetary way, i.e. in terms of number of 
lives saved) and their monetisation. Table 2 presents the main findings. The official 
guidelines suggest that ranges and intervals may be appropriate ways to take uncertainty 
about the future into account.  
Although practically all the IAs perform the basic function of stating that regulation has at 
least some costs and some benefits, there is a slight difference between the UK and the EU. 
The former seems to be inclined to stress the cost-side of regulation, whilst the EU is more 
attentive to benefits (see Table 2, columns 1 and 2). This finding seems to corroborate 
previous studies that have pointed to a cost-reduction emphasis in the UK regulatory reform 
initiatives and a trend towards wider governance models for the EU IA (Radaelli, 2005).  
Table 2. Percentage of IAs that identify, quantify, monetise costs and benefits of regulation over years; 
use of intervals for the estimation of costs and benefits, by year 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
Turning to quantification, the data show that the UK and the EU started from different levels 
of capacity to quantify costs and benefits. In 2005, only about one in four IAs of the 
Commission quantified benefits, whilst in the UK 44.7% contained benefit quantification. The 
gap in cost quantification was also stark. Four years later, in 2009, the gap between the UK 
and the Commission in terms of benefit quantification had disappeared, and the gap in cost 
quantification is now in favour of the European Commission. This finding confirms that the 
European Commission has successfully institutionalised its assessment system and 
developed capacity in a short time-span (Radaelli, 2010a; Radaelli & Meuwese, 2010). The 
surge in quantification may also be linked to the spread of the Standard-Cost Model, used 
for the measurement of administrative burdens, which has been included in the IA 
guidelines since March 2006, as Annex 10 to the 2005 guidelines.7 Then it was confirmed as 
Annex 10, also in the 2009 guidelines. 
                                                     
7 Although we do not cover this question here, our dataset shows that the EU Standard Cost Model 
was used in 30% of all Commission impact assessments (including those on non-binding legislation) 
between 2006 and 2009. In other words, while contributing to the surge in quantification, the SCM 
cannot account for the overall improvement on this item.  
UK EU UK EU UK EU UK EU UK EU UK EU UK EU UK EU
2005 90,6% 82,9% 88,2% 97,6% 67,1% 46,3% 44,7% 24,4% 57,6% 46,3% 34,1% 19,5% 14,1% 7,3% 4,7% 4,9%
2006 89,2% 97,1% 84,9% 100,0% 66,7% 54,3% 53,8% 37,1% 61,3% 51,4% 36,6% 34,3% 15,1% 14,3% 9,7% 5,7%
2007 96,3% 98,0% 86,4% 100,0% 77,8% 81,6% 58,0% 67,3% 69,1% 79,6% 42,0% 53,1% 17,3% 6,1% 13,6% 14,3%
2008 91,5% 98,8% 86,2% 98,8% 78,7% 91,6% 71,3% 74,7% 76,6% 89,2% 67,0% 62,7% 21,3% 30,1% 24,5% 21,7%
2009 97,6% 100,0% 89,0% 97,7% 85,4% 93,0% 62,2% 60,5% 81,7% 86,0% 60,1% 51,2% 25,6% 14,0% 22,0% 11,6%
2010 97,6% n.a. 88,1% n.a. 78,6% n.a. 50,0% n.a. 71,4% n.a. 52,4% n.a. 23,8% n.a. 21,4% n.a.
Average 93,3% 96,0% 87,0% 98,8% 75,3% 77,3% 57,4% 57,4% 69,4% 74,5% 48,6% 47,8% 19,1% 16,7% 15,7% 13,5%
Calculated range 
for costs
Calculated range 
for benefits
Identified       
costs
Identified 
benefits
Quantified    
costs
Quantified 
benefits
Monetised    
costs
Monetised 
benefits
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Regarding the further step of monetising costs, the data reveal two different periods for the 
European Commission: a period of low capacity in 2005 and 2006, and a period of increased 
monetisation of costs between 2007 and 2009, with a slight decrease in 2009. The pattern for 
the UK has no obvious interruptions, with steady improvement. Across the years, the gap 
between the UK and the EU narrows and eventually the EU overtakes the UK in terms of 
monetisation of at least some costs in an IA.  
As for benefit monetisation, the data confirm that this remains a difficult task in IA, both for 
the EU and the UK. In both cases, however, the effort is visible when 2005 data is compared 
to more recent data.  
Finally, the IA officers are still reluctant to take into account intervals and ranges for costs 
and benefits. In fairness, the presence of wide intervals for benefit and cost estimations 
complicate the identification of an option that is clearly superior to others. Thus, the low 
propensity to use intervals may be related to notions according to which IAs have to identify 
options that are superior to others. In some interviews, we heard that some high-level policy 
officers prefer point estimates to ranges – but we could not establish whether this insistence 
on point estimates is occasional or systematic, or more pronounced in the EU than in the UK. 
In the EU, the evidence on using intervals sparingly goes along with the trend on sensitivity 
analysis, which was performed in only 40 instances out of 251. 
We now contrast these results with the findings that go beyond the dimension of cost-benefit 
analysis. In Table 3 we report data on the degree of detail of policy objectives, types of policy 
intervention, and three aggregate categories measuring whether economic, social and 
environmental impacts have been calculated. 
Table 3. Percentage of IAs reporting on policy objectives, types of intervention and various categories 
of impact 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
First, we measure the extent to which impact assessments come with policy objectives that 
are operational and provide the basis for potential ex-post evaluations (European 
Commission, 2011). After all, operational objectives are a vital precondition for the effective 
monitoring and assessment of policy effectiveness. In this respect, the EU shows rather 
erratic behaviour, but seems to plateau around a 60% figure, in contrast to the UK, where 
operational objectives were identified in one fifth of all IAs only. However, the UK’s 2010 
value is the highest measured since 2005. 
Second, in order to explore the degree to which policy-makers consider alternative modes of 
regulation other than command and control, we coded the degree to which IAs discuss 
options like co-regulation, self-regulation, or market-based instruments. On average, 42% of 
UK EU UK EU UK EU UK EU UK EU UK EU
2005 20,0% 58,5% 25,9% 19,5% 3,5% 9,8% 95,3% 80,5% 77,6% 85,4% 23,5% 39,0%
2006 26,9% 42,9% 32,3% 34,3% 3,2% 14,3% 94,6% 80,0% 69,9% 74,3% 26,9% 42,9%
2007 23,5% 36,7% 29,6% 42,9% 16,0% 26,5% 93,8% 100,0% 59,3% 89,8% 28,4% 61,2%
2008 20,2% 59,0% 14,9% 53,0% 54,3% 27,7% 88,3% 100,0% 67,0% 90,4% 30,9% 78,3%
2009 17,1% 60,5% 28,0% 48,8% 61,0% 18,6% 90,2% 97,7% 80,5% 93,0% 34,1% 60,5%
2010 31,0% n.a. 23,8% n.a. 50,0% n.a. 90,5% n.a. 78,6% n.a. 33,3% n.a.
Average 22,4% 52,6% 25,8% 42,2% 30,0% 21,1% 92,2% 93,6% 71,5% 87,6% 29,1% 60,6%
Identified 
operational 
objectives
Assesses policy 
options for co‐, 
self‐ or market‐
based regulation
Calculated net 
benefits or cost 
effectiveness
Evaluated 
economic 
impacts
Evaluated     
social         
impacts
Evaluated 
environmental 
impacts
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all EU IAs consider types of intervention beyond top-down regulation with constant 
improvements over time from around 20 up to 50%. UK assessments, by contrast, rarely offer 
assessments of alternative modes of intervention; on average only one quarter of all IAs 
discusses policy options other than command-and-control. Further, there is no systematic 
pattern over time: while in 2005 almost a third of all British IAs discuss market-based 
instruments, co-regulation or self-regulation, two years later only 10% of all assessments 
feature this scorecard item. 
Third, with regard to the comprehensiveness of an impact assessment system, we developed 
three aggregate values on impacts related to the economy, society and the environment. For 
us, an IA considers economic impacts if it discusses the effects of proposed policies on 
competitiveness, competition, small and medium enterprises, investment and innovation, 
economic growth, trade, or inflation. We also speak of economic effects when administrative 
burdens for enterprises of all sizes are included. The data shows that both the UK and the EU 
have achieved a high level of this type of broad economic analysis, with more than 90% of all 
IAs elaborating on the effects of proposed legislation on the economy. Social impacts have 
attracted less attention in both jurisdictions but still show high degrees of coverage. This 
category aggregates the presence of scorecard items on health and safety, employment, social 
inclusion, non-discrimination and gender equality as well as education.  
While the EU assesses social impacts almost as often as economic impacts, there is a clear 
divide in the UK, where social impacts are covered less rigorously than economic ones. 
Environmental impacts; an aggregate of estimated effects on water, air, biodiversity, the 
climate, and energy use, play a relatively minor role in the UK. In Britain, only 26% of all IAs 
feature assessments of how policies impact on our natural environment – although we 
observe a slow but steady upward trend.  
In the EU, by contrast, 60% of all IAs discuss environmental impacts. The relatively high 
scores in the EU on social impacts, in contrast to environmental effects, may be due to the 
adoption of dedicated social assessment guidelines, developed by DG Employment, Social 
Affairs, and Equal Opportunities, which were referenced by the 2009 EU IA guidelines. 
Specific separate guidance documents on social impacts, as well as a separate guideline on 
fundamental rights, are now available on the Commission’s website.8 
5. Discussion 
Our data suggest similarities, but also differences between the UK and the EU in assessing 
the impacts of policy proposals. We discuss these differences in relation to three broad 
categories: time, areas of analysis, and specific events. 
First, although patterns are rarely linear, we observe a steady improvement over time in the 
comprehensiveness of most categories. This is true for most scorecard items related to costs 
and benefits. Likewise, the presence of non-CBA scorecard items has increased between 2005 
and 2010 in both the UK and the EU. Learning through practice and the gradual 
institutionalisation of IA in the British and European policy-making processes might be 
potential causes of this development. Major elements of learning and institutionalisation are, 
on the one hand, the publication and increased salience of IA guidance documents in 
London and Brussels. On the other hand, the varied coverage of particular scorecard items in 
Britain and the EU might result in specific social norms and expectations, on the side of both 
policy-makers and regulatees who expect a set of items to be discussed in an IA and 
                                                     
8 Further details and the full guidelines can be found at (http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId= 
760&langId=en&preview=cHJldmlld0VtcGxQb3J0YWwh). 
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therefore create communities of practice and routines. However, our data on economic 
impacts or the identification of costs and benefits also show that both the UK and the EU 
have, for specific scorecard items, achieved degrees of quality that are unlikely to be 
improved in the future. In particular, relatively high scores on CBA and economic impacts in 
the UK benefit from the long tradition of cost-related assessment in various guises in Britain.  
Second, economic and cost-related assessments receive on average higher scores than 
assessments of environmental or social impacts, policy options, or policy objectives. This can 
plausibly be traced back to the history of IA that developed from benefit-cost foundations in 
the US (although US CBAs also cover social and environmental impacts), and landed in 
Europe in this form. However, in some cases one might also think of interaction effects 
between EU impact assessments and domestic analyses conducted in the member states, i.e. 
the UK. For instance, much of the UK’s environmental regulation today originated years 
before in Brussels.  
In general, we were suprised to see similarities between the EU and the UK in terms of 
approach, but this is how we reasoned at the start of the project. We thought that, after all, 
the monetisation and quantification aspects are much more difficult to deal with for a 
complex economic system (despite the common market) such as the EU-27 than for a single 
economic system as the UK. We were expecting (and in a sense we would have easily 
accounted for) less quantification in the EU than in the UK, given that entities like ‘single 
point estimations’ are a tall order for the EU-27. Likewise, social or environmental impacts 
are much more diverse for the EU-27 than for a single country, suggesting that such analyses 
are harder to carry out in the EU than in the UK. Our findings, however, suggest that the UK 
and the EU perform equally well in many dimensions, defying our initial expectations of the 
EU estimates being more problematic and less likely to materialise in the IAs. Obviously, this 
does not tell us whether the single-point estimations (and more generally economic analysis) 
for the EU-27 are better than those for the UK. In the absence of ex-post studies on the 
accuracy of economic estimates, nothing can be said on this important point. 
Third, there are specific events representing turning points in British and EU impact 
assessment – e.g. the publication of new guidelines or government change or the 
appointment of a new Commission. Take the year 2009. This was a significant one for the 
European Commission. Specifically, it coincided with three events that had the potential to 
affect the overall impact assessment process: the entry into force of a new set of IA 
guidelines, the election of the new European Parliament for the term 2009 to 2014 and, last 
but not least, the renewal of the College of Commissioners with the start of the Barroso II 
Cabinet. While the latter two changes are not fully comparable to the effect of general 
elections in a national context (where legislative proposals that are not adopted by the 
incumbent legislature are aborted), changes at the top level in the Commission may have 
resulted in a slowing down of activities in 2009. Table 3 shows that this has happened for 
some categories but not for others. In short, there is no general slowdown in the depth of 
appraisal in 2009, although quantity (see Table 1) did decrease. 
Indeed, in terms of quantity, we did not expect the number of proposals put forward by the 
European Commission to be influenced by the elections in the European Parliament. 
Proposals tend to follow a preset timetable (and as explained in the 2009 IA Guidelines, the 
standard impact assessment process can take up to 52 weeks) and are less linked to the 
political mood than in a national context. In other words, we did not expect the Commission 
to depart very much from its initial work programme to rush through a set of proposals 
towards the end of the legislature. Yet, one could still think of two rival hypotheses on the 
quantity of IAs in relation to the change of guard at the top level of the Commission: on the 
one hand, a surge of initiatives towards the end of the Commission’s mandate to exploit 
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windows of opportunity that could be absent under a different cabinet. On the other hand, a 
slowing down of activities, should a new Commissioner and its cabinet take a different 
direction from its predecessor. The figures seem to support the second hypothesis, although 
we cannot generalise here as this is the first time that there has been a change of Commission 
with a fully functioning impact assessment system.  
As regards quality or depth of appraisal, one cannot make sound inferences on whether 
elections in the European Parliament and a new Cabinet of Commissioners affect incentives 
for individual IA drafters. To be sure, changes in the Commission are associated with some 
reshuffling across departments. EU IAs in 2009 show a deterioration in terms of 
quantification and monetisation. This could be the result of more pressure to deliver the 
proposals to the legislator before the change of the Commission, which in turn reduced the 
time spent on appraisal. Further, due to the financial crisis, several policy initiatives had to 
be undertaken with no IA at that time, or with a rushed and rough IA. More importantly, the 
quality of EU IAs seem to be positively affected by the creation of the IAB. In 2007, when the 
IAB became operational, several indicators show a sharp increase in the order of magnitude 
of 20 to 30%, e.g. for the quantification of costs and benefits, the monetisation of costs and 
benefits, and the evaluation of the three main categories of impacts. The IAB may have 
behaved as an effective gatekeeper (Renda, 2006) and increased the compliance with existing 
IA guidelines. Yet again we need caution in interpreting these results, since all we have in 
the data is a trend in quality of IA that corresponds to the creation and entry into operation 
of the IAB. 
For the UK, the key year to consider is 2007, when the guidelines were changed in order to 
stimulate deeper and better economic analysis. In particular, the 2007 guidelines came along 
with two summary pages dedicated to policy objectives, costs and benefits, enforcement 
costs, and selected economic costs and burdens. We therefore expected 2008 and later years 
to reflect this change. Our findings do indeed show considerable improvements in 2008 and 
2009 in those categories that had not yet reached the  ‘plateau’ of 90% and more, for instance 
regarding the quantification and monetisation of costs and benefits. 
Finally, one needs to keep in mind that the standard-cost model has effectively been used in 
ex-ante anlyses in the UK and the EU only since 2007. In the UK, this occurred after the PWC 
baseline measurement concluded in 2006; in the EU, after the incorporation of Annex 10 in 
the IA guidelines, again in 2006.  
6. Conclusions 
Our analysis suggests that impact assessment is taken seriously in the UK and the European 
Commission. The first conclusion is that, when looking at a large number of IAs, we cannot 
support the thesis that IA is merely a perfunctory exercise in these two systems. The second 
conclusion is that time matters. Both in the UK and the EU, IA documents achieve high 
scores on many key elements of ex-ante policy appraisal, while dimensions neglected in the 
past are now steadily being addressed. Improvements in the analysis of social and 
environmental effects or the consideration of a range of regulatory options beyond 
command-and-control suggest that the overall changes are definitely more than a 
consequence of adopting the standard-cost model in the UK and at EU level. Instead, 
learning-in-time has made a difference. 
We cannot infer from the data whether higher quality over the years is the result of robust 
oversight, infra-organisational learning, and more precise guidelines – these factors have 
most likely played a role, although we cannot estimate their relative contribution to the 
overall quality levels.  
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The question whether the IAB should be more independent seems less important once we 
observe that economic analysis and the identification of costs and benefits are uniformly 
high in both the UK and the EU. If deeper economic analysis (and not political, partisan 
control) is what policy-makers look for when they establish oversight units, there is not 
much difference between the UK and the EU. 
Most observers of IA are concerned with the quality of economic analysis. If we look at this 
dimension of appraisal, the two systems we observed seem to live up to their expectations: 
IA in the UK and the EU has become an instrument geared towards the economic analysis of 
policy proposals. The EU, however, seems to have made an effort to stay close to the original 
template of integrated impact assessment, outperforming the UK on the estimation of social 
and environmental effects. For instance, the emphasis on setting specific and operational 
objectives is on the rise, thereby suggesting a sort of paradigm shift from a US-style IA to an 
IA model geared towards policy consistency and coherence. In this sense, the EU system is 
broader and not exclusively oriented to the economic dimension.  
If we narrow down economic analysis to specific items of cost-benefit analysis, we see that 
quantification and monetisation are still relatively problematic areas. But yet again, the EU 
and the UK do not differ significantly here. Although we tried to reduce bias, as explained 
above in Section 3, the absence of quantification and monetisation in so many IAs may result 
from the fact that at the moment there are no suitable data, or that it did not make sense to 
invest a lot of time and resources in these steps, given the limited expected effect of the 
proposals. One way to control for this is to check whether larger IAs (in terms of total 
expected costs for example) have on average more depth in quantification and estimation 
than narrower IAs. This is something that could be addressed in future research. 
Future research could also explore the differences between various government departments 
or DGs. Do departments provide particularly good analyses in their core competences or do 
they follow, on average, requirements laid down in the guidelines? Which analyses are of 
particular importances for what category of  departments? We also have to go back to our 
data and explore the full set of variables, including consultation, monitoring und evaluation, 
and so on – as mentioned, this paper reports on the main, aggregate, findings. It is possible  
that under-performance in one component of appraisal, say economic analysis, is 
compensated by outstanding performance in consultation or problem definition, for 
example. 
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